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8 June 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT Planning

REFERENCE: Our various conversations since the
Knights of the Alibi Round Table

1. I submit the following papers for provocation or, as is more unlikely, edification:

a. A copy of my memorandum of 29 May 1952 on the Strategic Division abroad which seeks to incorporate the views of the Offices, as Mr. Becker at that time had requested me to do, and some of our own thinking.

b. A copy of our "Planning Book" prepared at the instance of Mr. Becker, who, about a year ago, told OIC to consider itself the Planning Office for the DD/I. This particular issue was prepared for his return last December, and while it is not current, it is at least illustrative of our feeble efforts to meet his demand. In the book I have also inserted at the beginning a memorandum for the DCI which I prepared at the end of the first year of my stewardship, sort of an annual report. I call particular attention to the covering memorandum, since it deals with the subject of methodology. The report itself is only an annual roundup on the order of the monthly reports you recall I had distributed four or five times before.

c. In furtherance of the planning injunction from Mr. Becker, I was able to persuade Mr. Carey to produce an annual status report and projection of plans, a copy of which from one of his units, namely the [] is attached. (I chose this one because it is the smallest and still illustrative). In less formal fashion, OCD has also made an effort, and you will find that in the Planning Book under the subject of "Utilization of Foreign Language Materials," where I have a paper clip.

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2. There are no papers attached on the following, but here are some comments on specific offices:

a. ONE -- As you know, ONE has an annual program published, and more or less agreed to among the agencies, with some room for flexibility to meet crash estimates. In connection with estimates, as you may recall, there is a procedure for post-mortems which has been followed somewhat usefully, particularly in SE-27, because of the stimulation which it provided for exploiting overt literature (this is now all tied in with the NSCID-16 Committee on Foreign Language Publications). Our reservations about the post-mortem process are now being discussed with ONE.

b. OCI -- OCI undoubtedly does planning of sorts, much of which may relate to USCIB matters, to which I am not privy. My own contacts with them have been largely in two respects: (1) in arranging for Agency agreement on the publications pattern and, (2) with respect to requirements I have found in [] of OCI an imaginative and aggressive approach to the real problems in requirements which, by and large, are not mechanical. As little as it is, I would say he has done more with regard to a proper and useful relationship with OIR and IAD (State) than the rest of OCI. (One of my suggestions in this area, namely, to get inter-agency discussion and possibly concurrence in the Current Intelligence Weekly, has gotten nowhere. Since these studies deal with subjects of direct interest to the military and the Department of State, and since any such production requires projecting ahead, it seemed to me worth while to try to provide the President and his principal officers with "authoritative" current intelligence articles. (I use the "authoritative" in the same way that National Intelligence Estimates are "authoritative").

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c. OSI has had [] planning for quite some time (about a year I believe) and while no plan has emerged publicly, it is said that quite a little has been accomplished.

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d. ORR, as you may know, has its mammoth production planning, which even has the scheduling down to the number of man hours required for production.

e. DD/P -- As my Planning Book shows, the contacts of this Office with respect to DD/P have been confined to the fields

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of psychological intelligence support, external research, and requirements (apart from that seemingly bastard responsibility NSC-29, for which by order of [redacted] I am the Agency Coordinator). Rightly or wrongly, my own attitude has been that as we are now set up, OIC should not impose its assistance on DD/P, but rather be available when DD/P requests assistance and, of course, to take the initiative where the problem concerning DD/P emanates from the DD/I area. I am certain that you are far and away more familiar with planning in DD/P than I could possibly be (i.e., you know [redacted]).

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3. On planning generally, while the sources of stimuli for planning may come from anywhere, they perhaps most often arise from those working people who are meeting the frustration of their responsibilities by evolving new ideas. Insofar as these are substantive, meaning intelligence production, it seems to me that they ought to burn right up through their proper channels within each Office and that insofar as production is related to ONE planning, in that respect it is in quite competent CIA hands. Insofar as it related to other agencies, the problem immediately falls into the area where it seems to me the Knights of the Round Table drifted, namely, intelligence activities, which includes projects or functions and as is usual in our complicated government, in cooperation with or in opposition to some other jurisdiction.

4. OIC and planning -- As far as I am concerned, outside of the limitations of myself and those people who are on my staff, our greatest limitations have been (a) the lack of opportunity to observe front office developments (for this reason there are facets of the Agency's work and decision thereon which have no effect on our thinking), and (b), lack of rapport with the AD's generally. (This may be explained as follows:

a. Line offices understandably prefer to talk directly to and get their problems settled by their immediate superiors and they are confident at least subconsciously that what they want will be less disturbed if a staff office is not invited to express its views; and,

b. On a great many questions, as you are aware, this Office has tended to be in a minority of one, particularly where the schizophrenic circumstances apply, that is, where the responsibility of the Director for the federal intelligence system and the

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responsibility of the Director for achieving Agency objectives or hopes appear in conflict).

Another limitation which really has to do most with our own abilities is the fact that at times point (a) in the immediate above has not been most tactfully handled by us. Thus I could cite cases where in dealing with, let us say, OSI, probing questions of ours, perhaps not most tactfully expressed, have brought resistance in the form: "What are you trying to do, run OSI?" We are well aware that this is a delicate matter, and as we get older we hope to get wiser.

JAMES Q. REBER
Assistant Director
Intelligence Coordination

OIC:JQR:KR (8 June 1953)

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